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I. Introduction 
 
Positive inter-store externalities, sometimes termed as demand externalities (Eppli and 
Benjamin 1994), are the positive effects generated from one or more tenant(s) to other 
tenant(s) without consent and compensation between the generator and receiver. In 
previous research, demand externalities were usually seen as the synonym of 
customer-spillover effects generated from anchor tenants (Gatzlaff, et al. 1994; 
Pashigian and Gould 1998). These demand externalities have been recognized as 
significant agglomeration economies that generate increased returns in shopping 
centres. However, agglomeration economies in shopping centres could be more than 
just the spillover of customer drawing power of the anchor tenants. Under a wider 
definition of positive inter-store externalities, these inter-store effects should have a 
broader content including compatibility and complementarity among tenants, 
enhancement of the shopping atmosphere and resulting sales efforts, shopper 
circulation and the public services and facilities provided by the shopping centre. 
These positive interactive effects are the sources generating increasing returns (Fujita 
and Thisse 2002). 
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Consequently, one of the most critical objectives in shopping centre management is to 
maximize these positive inter-store externalities in order to achieve the highest profits 
and investment returns possible. Although we know a well-managed shopping 
environment should be able to enhance or improve these external benefits, the 
question is how to internalise or manage these inter-store externalities. Three basic 
solutions for externalities provided by economic theories are Pigouvian tax/subsidy, 
Coase Theorem and regulation through government intervention. In practice, almost 
all management and internalising devices are designed under these three basic 
solutions. Management and internalisation processes are accomplished through the 
distribution of obligations and resources among tenants, such as rents, service charges, 
leasing incentives and other non-monetary obligations and regulations. 
 
As a result, the most significant information needed to internalise or manage positive 
inter-store externalities is to find the dominant factors producing these benefits: what 
are the strongest positive inter-store externalities generator?. In this research, we try to 
look for the meaning of “strong” tenants and observe the internalising process through 
empirical study.  In the empirical analysis, we examine regional shopping centres in 
the UK for both performance and characteristics information. In total, 148 regional 
shopping centres with a size above 27,870 square metres (300,000 sq ft) are collected. 
The major objective in the empirical study is to test for the impact of “strong” tenants 
base on three characteristics a) size of tenant, b) strength of chain stores and c) the top 
retailers in each retail/service categories. Some additional results are obtained for 
other regional and shopping centre characteristics variables, results that seem 
consistent with prior reasons on both shopping behaviour and urban land values.  
 
II. Agglomeration economies and inter-store externalities-a review 
Retail agglomeration 
 
Retail and commercial service stores cluster together in certain streets or areas. For 
example, in London, Oxford Street has a cluster of major department stores and most 
of the major bookstores in the UK can be found in Charing Cross Road. This trend in 
retail store clustering must be motivated by some incentive or advantage for those 
stores agglomerating together. In retail location theory, Nelson (1958) was the first to 
illustrate that the agglomeration of retail activities is based on the theory of 
cumulative attraction and the principal of compatibility. In his research, the theory of 
cumulative attraction states that “a given number of stores dealing in the same 
merchandise will do more business if they are located adjacent or in proximity to each 
other than if they are widely scattered” (Nelson 1958, p58). 
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Retail store spatial affinities were also observed by Getis and Getis, (1976). In their 
research they suggested that retail store spatial affinities are based on three location 
theories; the theory of land use and land value, central place theory and the theory of 
tertiary activity. After examining retail stores in the CBDs of a sample of cities in the 
US, they confirmed that retail store spatial affinities do exist and are matched with 
notions from central place theory (Getis and Getis 1976). Among these location 
theories, Christaller’s central place theory, which established the hierarchy of retail 
activities, and Hotelling’s principle of minimum differentiation in homogeneous 
agglomeration of retailers are known the two location theories supporting this 
phenomenon (Eppli and Benjamin 1994). All the above theories relating to store 
clustering give us some hints concerning the agglomeration of retail stores; whether 
they are homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether they generate some kind of 
collective or inter-store advantages and whether these consequently increase 
transaction opportunities and store profits.  
 
Nevertheless, these theories are not in themselves sufficient to reveal the precise 
forces determining micro-scale store location or how the interaction between these 
clustering stores influence each other. There are still two questions to be addressed. 
The first question concerns the inter-store advantages generated by agglomeration. 
The second question concerns whether it is possible to enhance or manage any 
positive inter-store effects so as to achieve higher collective benefits for all stores. 
The shopping centre or mall is as extreme good case study to pursue these questions 
of agglomeration economies.  
 
Positive inter-store externalities 
 
The shopping centre or mall is the agglomeration of selected multiple retailers and 
commercial service providers within a well planed, designed and managed building or 
a group of buildings as a unit (Urban Land Institution 1999; ICSC 2002). Within the 
shopping centre, tenants are able to receive mutual benefits, not only from other 
individual stores but also from the collective advantages of the whole shopping centre. 
For instance, small tenants depend on the strong customer drawing power generated 
by anchor stores and the “spill-over” of their customers to these smaller tenants 
(Benjamin, et al. 1992; Brueckner 1993; Gatzlaff, et al. 1994; Miceli, et al. 1998; 
Pashigian and Gould 1998). At the same time, the mixture of small tenants provide 
variety and supportive services for the whole centre (Wakefield and Baker 1998).  
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Under this mixture of tenants, strong brand name retailers and other popular stores 
spillover their sales efforts to other tenants (Miceli and Sirman 1995), establishing the 
positive image of the centre. Moreover, agglomeration generates positive shopping 
“atmospheres” (Burns and Warren 1995; Wakefield and Baker 1998; Bone and Ellen 
1999) and saves customers’ time in searching for and acquiring the goods and 
services they desire (Kaufman and Lane 1996). Furthermore, the tenants also share 
their obligations in the provision of quality public services and facilities (Corns and 
Sandler 1986; Oppewal and Timmermans 1999), which would not be available if they 
were scattered as single-freestanding stores. By sharing the total costs of the public 
services and facilities, these tenants obtain the collective benefits of higher quantity 
and quality of services and facilities so as to be able to draw and serve more 
customers in a shopping centre.  
 
All of the above positive interactive effects, i.e. the positive inter-store externalities, 
form the centre’s synergy (Nelson 1958; Anikeeff 1996) and generate increasing 
returns from economies of scale/scope (Goldstein and Gronberg 1984; Fujita 1989; 
Fujita and Thisse 2002) within the shopping centre. This synergy increases the 
interchange of customer footfall among stores and also raises operational performance, 
namely the turnover, profits and rental value of each tenant. Positive inter-store 
externalities are, therefore, favourable  interactive effects generated from one store 
which spillover to other store(s) without the consent between generators and receivers 
or the receipt of proper compensation or subsidy (Meade 1952; Brueckner 1993; 
Papandreou 1994). The receivers of these positive effects are therefore “free riders” or 
“easy riders” (Corns and Sandler 1984) on the effect generators.  
 
This implies an inefficient condition between these two parties because of unbalanced 
rights and obligations. The existence of inefficiency1 is a harmful situation in the 
system, as the generators do not have any obligation to provide those positive 
externalities to the free riders. Accordingly, without any incentive or compensation, 
the generators will not maintain or enhance their ability to generate positive effects for 
others. However, despite these positive inter-store externalities being only a 
“by-product” to the generators, they are essential resources for those stores receiving 
benefits and for the centre as a whole. Consequently, maintaining and enhancing these 
positive inter-store externalities becomes one of the most crucial tasks for shopping 
centre management. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The efficient condition equates to “Pareto optimality”. 
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Unlike negative inter-store externalities, which directly damage the utility functions  
of the “victim” tenants2, the influences of positive inter-store externalities are more 
crucial in establishing the value of the shopping centre. The main objective for tenants 
agglomerated in a shopping centre is to maximize their operational income and total 
profits. Hence positive inter-store externalities form the centre synergy in helping 
individual store operations are most significant effects to the tenants. Lack of centre 
synergy means lack of transaction opportunities and that damage may be as great as 
negative inter-store effects. Since centre synergy comes from positive inter-store 
externalities, the purpose in managing them is not only to internalise these 
externalities but also to maintain or increase the strength of these positive inter-store 
forces. 
 
Internalisation and managerial solutions 
 
Consequently, how should management seek to internalise or manage these inter-store 
externalities is the next issue. Three basic solutions to externalities provided by 
economic theories are a) Pigouvian tax/subsidy, b) Coase Theorem and c) constraint 
regulations through government intervention (Whitcomb 1972; Baumol and Oates 
1975; Miyao and Kanemoto 1987). The Pigouvian tax/subsidy approach directly 
implies a tax/subsidy mechanism between the effect generators and receivers. Under 
this internalisation process, the benefit receivers should pay a “tax” which is equal to 
the amount of benefits received from the generators in subsidizing the beneficial 
production3. Coase theorem asserts tha t by clearly delineated the property rights of the 
externalities, the efficiency condition (Pareto Optimal) between the effect receivers 
and generators can be achieved by negotiation. However, high transaction costs 
usually become an obstacle to internalising externalities through these two approaches. 
Under such a circumstance, rules or regulations set and implemented by government 
or a third party become the best and most feasible way to manage externalities.  
 
In practice, almost all internalisation and management devices are designed within 
these three basic approaches. For example, in shopping centres, clearly defined 
physical and intangible rights and obligations in the leasing contract can eliminate the 
sources of negative inter-store externalities, so as to prevent conflicts between tenants 
and the centre manager.  
                                                 
2 See Yuo (2002) 
3 Since external economies are the major concern in this research, this discussion in internalising 
focuses  on benefit subsidies. However, the internalising process through Pigouvian tax/subsidies in 
negative externalities is a vis -à-vis  case, that the victims of the externalities should be compensated by 
the negative effects generators with the amount equal to the difference between social marginal costs 
and private marginal costs.  
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A well designed and implemented tenant mix strategy can also prevent negative 
effects among tenants by tenant selection or zoning specific retail categories. 
Furthermore, agglomeration economies can be enhanced by internalising the 
externalities through properly distributing the rents, service charges, leasing 
incentives and other non-monetary obligations among tenants, so as to establish the 
strongest tenant mix. 
 
In this research, the examination of the process of internalising positive inter-store 
externalities through a Pigouvian tax/subsidy mechanism is our main interest. Under 
the Pigouvain tax/subsidy approach, those tenants that generate positive externalities 
should be subsidized by those “free riders” that enjoy these benefits. In previous 
research on the internalisation of positive inter-store externalities generated by anchor 
stores, Pashigain and Gould (1998) suggested the concept of rent premiums and rent 
subsidies should be implied in this process. They asserted that “mall developers 
internalise these externalities by offering rent subsidies to anchors and by charging 
rent premiums to other mall tenants” (Pashigian and Gould 1998, p115). Their 
research suggested that anchor tenants receive a rent subsidy equivalent to 72% of the 
rent paid by non-anchors.  
 
The power of anchor stores has already been proven in several previous studies 
(Gatzlaff, et al. 1994; Finn and Louviere 1996; Pashigian and Gould 1998). 
Nevertheless, the examination of positive inter-store externalities has not be 
comprehensive:  
 
First, Brueckner (1993) suggested that tenants with stronger (positive) inter-store 
externalities should be allocated greater floor space. We thus know size matters. 
However, is it that larger tenants generate more positive inter-store externalities rather 
than strong positive inter-store externalities should be allocated more space? This is a 
question about what kind of tenant can provide more variety (both in width and depth 
of product lines) in merchandises and services. Our suggestion is that size can 
generate stronger positive inter-store externalities.  
 
Ambiguity in positive effects generators is another problem. Who is the generator? In 
general, every tenant in the shopping centre has a role in the whole agglomeration 
economies environment, on customer drawing power spillover, on variety, on 
supportive services…etc. It is hard to distinguish who relies upon whom. For example, 
aside from power of anchor tenant, Pashigian and Gould  (1998, p115) also observed 
“lesser-known stores can free ride off the reputations of better-known stores.”  
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This reputation free-rider effect is similar to the “sales efforts spillover” effects 
suggested by Miceli and Sirman (1995). These “better-known” or “sales efforts 
spillover” effects mean that weaker stores can free ride off the brands, the image or 
even the customer service satisfaction of stronger tenants. The suggestion is that the 
stronger the tenant, the lower the rent it should pay. Of course, the major issue here is 
how to define a “strong” tenant.  
 
One of the main aims of this research is to find out some definition of “strong” tenant, 
i.e. the strong positive externality generators, the existence of rent premiums and 
subsidies and how they are distributed through different tenant characteristics. Three 
different indices will be used in defining “strong” tenants, a) different size band of the 
tenant (defined as anchor tenants, major space users ((MSUs)), large standard tenants, 
small standard tenants, and small tenants); b) the number of outlets appearing in (148) 
regional shopping centres in the database, (these will be classified as strong chains, 
medium chains, weak chains, and independent retailers); and c) the “top” retailers in 
each retail/service categories as provided by the Freeman’s Guide (2002).  
 
The examination of the internalising process is still not completed by this research 
since the definition of a “strong” retailer may be time varying due to changing market 
and fashion trends, consumer preferences in various shopping and recreation activities 
or the special market segmentation strategies of each shopping centre. Further, other 
internalising/managing devices like the terms of the leasing contract or leasing 
incentives under the principles of Coase Theorem and second-best regulation can also 
provide the same adjustment outcomes as the Pigouvian tax/subsidy approach. The 
appropriate use of these different internalising/ managing tools depends on each 
shopping centre manager ’s objectives in operation and management. Furthermore, 
there may be local or regional variances in positive (or negative) effects.  
 
III. Empirical analysis 
The Data 
 
The data collection was targeted on all the regional shopping centres in the UK for 
both performance and characteristics information. In the final database, a total of 1484 
regional shopping centres under the definition of above 300,000 square foot are 
included. The database was collated from multiple published sources, including 
                                                 
4 These 148 shopping centres are narrowed down from a total of 214 shopping centres drawn from 
different sources of data, by eliminating the centres that are under construction, not located in mainland 
Britain, or categorized as shopping/retail parks. 
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Freeman’s Guide 2002, Shopping Centre and Retail Directory 2002 by William Reed 
Company, and EGI’s Shopping Centre Research and Market Place databases during 
January 2002 to October 2002. From these sources, two linked databases were created. 
The first contains detailed characteristics information for these 148 shopping centres, 
including the tenant lists of all the shopping centres with 11,918 detailed records of 
individual tenants with name, retail category, also country of origin…etc. However, 
the availability of individua l information in terms of size of units, rental levels, and 
service charges is limited. The second database provides information on unit size and 
rental levels for individual units within the 148 shopping centres from different 
sources. In the second database, some 1,930 records with detailed occupier 
information were collected including name of occupier, rental level (total rent per 
annum or rent per square foot/metre), retail activities, size of tenants, etc. 
 
In addition to the two databases, additional contextual information such as regional 
retail rental levels and shopping centre rental growth rates have been collected from 
the Property Market Report 2002, Investment Property Databank, and Jones Lang 
LaSalle’s 50 Centres Retail Rents (May, 2002). 
 
All the shopping centre detail information was collected in year 2002. The tenant lists 
of shopping centres are dated for the period between January 2002 to March 2002. 
Since tenant composition will change over time, setting a specific time in data 
collection is crucial in maintaining data quality for later analysis. The rent level of 
each tenancy, however, is a difficult but crucial variable. Although the bulk at the 
rental data is contemporaneous, the rental date ranges from 1981 to 2002. Therefore, 
proper adjustment of the rental data on a regional basis is required. This will be 
discussed later.  
 
Hypotheses and definitions 
 
The internalising process provided by the Pigouvian tax/subsidy approach told us that 
the positive externalities receivers, i.e. the free riders or perhaps, the “weaker” tenants, 
need to pay higher rents as rent premiums in subsidizing those benefit generators. 
Those tenants who enjoy lower rents are usually treated as “strong” tenants because 
other mall tenants or the whole shopping centre demand their presence to generate 
spillover and other positive effects. As noted above, strong tenants can be defined in 
several ways: they are either:  
a) anchor tenants or major space users (MSUs) who occupy a large proportion of 
space in the centre and have a major magnetic effects in drawing customers; or  
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b) they are major/strong chain stores that can provide the shopping centre with a 
stable and reliable income stream and also have customer drawing power; or c) 
they are well-know international/national brand names that are highly popular 
to customers and, therefore, who can increase the image quality of the 
shopping centre.  
 
Hence, three major hypotheses in this empirical research are:  
 
Ha: Larger tenants should pay lower rents, and smaller tenants will have to pay 
higher rents as a rent premium compensating for the positive external effects 
they have enjoyed. 
 
Hb: The stronger the chain, the lower the rent paid; by contrast, the weaker the 
chains, the higher the rents paid to in compensate for the benefits enjoyed 
results from the presence of stronger chains. 
 
Hc: Top retailers, that is, the leading brands in a particular retail category, will pay 
lower rents, other things equal. 
 
The significance of size of units as a dominant variable in rentals per square unit in 
shopping centres has been confirmed by several empirical studies (Gerbich 1998; Tay, 
et al. 1999). Nevertheless, under the positive inter-store externalities hypothesis, we 
still want to make confirm the negative relationship between unit size and rent per 
square foot. More importantly, we seek further to test rental levels among different 
size groups to understand the nature of the rent distribution. From preliminary 
analysis of the collected data, tenants are classified in to five different size groups, the 
anchor tenants, MSUs, large standard tenants, small standard tenants, and small 
tenants. The size bands are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table1: The definition of tenants grouping by size 
Groups Tenant categories Size Range N 
5 Anchor tenants over 30,000sq ft 14 
4 Major space users (MSUs) 10,000-30,000sq ft 61 
3 Large Standard tenants 4,000-10,000 sq ft 216 
2 Small standard Tenants 1,500-4,000 sq ft 711 
1 Small Tenants under 1,500 sq ft 819 
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To test the second hypothesis, we calculated the number of outlets each brand had in 
the 148 shopping centres. These figures were then used to band tenants into five 
categories, as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table2: Chain strength determined by number of outlets 
Groups Definition Number range N 
3 Strong Chain Over 50 outlets 382 
2 Medium Chain 10-50 outlets 573 
1 Weak Chain 2-10 outlets 441 
0 Independent Single outlet 394 
     
Inter-store externalities are clearly not the sole determinant of rent. From previous 
urban economic and shopping centre research (e.g. Sirmans and Guidry 1993; Tay, et 
al. 1999; Hardin III, et al. 2002), we know that regional factors and shopping centre 
characteristics are also crucial in determining outlet and centre rents. In order to test 
for the effects of externalities, we need to include Key regional demand driver 
variables that capture purchasing power, income levels and population density. Thus 
variables such as footfall, shopping catchement and regional retail rental rent averages 
are included. 
 
Shopping centre characteristic variables are more complex in that they may interact 
with the collective benefits from inter-store externalities. Hence the image of the 
centre, shoppers’ circulation, tenant placement, variety, amenity, atmosphere, public 
services and facilities are derived from store interactions. Other shopping centre 
characteristic variables act more like adjustment variables for rents. We include 
factors such as age of centre, shopping centre size, number of units, lease terms, 
shopping centre location type, enclosure type and parking spaces in our model. By 
including these regional and shopping centre variables in the model, we can focus on 
testing the three hypotheses. 
 
Modelling Shopping Centre Rents 
    
The analysis is designed in two stages. The first stage is to test the influence and 
significance of the independent variables to the response variable rent per square foot 
of the tenants using multi-regression models. The second stage focuses explicitly on 
the externalities variables using an ANOVA approach. The multiple regression 
models include regional urban and shopping centre variables along with proxies for 
inter-store externalities. 
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Unit size, unit size grouping, number of outlets, chain strength and strongly branded 
tenants are the major independent variables used to examine the three hypotheses 
concern positive inter-store externalities. However, both size and number of outlets 
and the derived groupings are highly collinear. Therefore, they will be tested in two 
linked but separate models.  
 
Model 1 directly uses the size of unit and number of outlets as quantitative variables. 
Model 2 is identical other than using the categorical variables defined in Table 1 and 
Table 2. 
 
Several adjustments are needed prior to analysis. The most important adjustment is to 
the dependent variable, rent variable. Rental data available was mostly recent but 
targeted in date from 1981 to 2002. We use the following formula to adjust rents to a 
common 2002 date: 
Õ +=
n
n
t
jti rSi
Yit
y )1(  
iy : adjusted retail rent per sq ft of retail i  
itY : total rent per annum of retaileri at year t. 
iS : unit size of retailer i (sq ft) 
njt
r : retail rental growth rate in region j at year nt  
nt : years from the time of occupation to year 2002 
 
We note that, with UK lease terms and five year rent reviews, such an adjustment is 
problematic. Fortunately, the majority of data comes from new lettings so that this 
should not materially affect the results.  
 
To deal with potential problems of heterosedasiticity, White’s adjustment is applied to 
provide consistent standard error and covariance. We also test for nonlinear 
relationships among numerical variables via a variety of transformation include 
natural log, square root, square and combinations of these. In our models, we found 
clear that multicollinearity problems with three variables: shopping centre size, 
shopping centre unit number and average unit size of each shopping centre. These 
variables are important in understanding the influence of variety and economies of 
scale and each has its own influence. However, in order to reduce multicollinearity 
problems, the “average unit size of each shopping centre” variable (the one 
contributing least to explanation) has been eliminated from the models reported. 
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Model 1:  
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ=
ParkingFootfallsentSQSCcatchmSCcathmentSCencloseSClocation
SClevelsLnSCunitsSQRTSCsizeNoutletsLtermsSCageUSizeSTenantRRRL
fLnrentsqft i ,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,  
 
Model 2:  
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
ParkingFootfallsentSQSCcatchmSCcathmentSCencloseSClocationSClevels
LnSCunitsSQRTSCsizeNgroupingLtermsSCageSgroupingSTenantRRRL
fLnrentsqfti ,,,,,,
,,,,,,,,  
where 
 
Table3: Definitions of variables 
Variables Description Data Type  
Lnrentsqfti Logarithm of rent per square foot of the occupied retailer i. Numerical 
RRRL The appropriate regional retail rental level in April 2002  Numerical 
STenant Strong tenants, from Freeman’s Guide 2002, all top retailer/service 
providers in each retail categories, 1(top retailer), 0(non-top retailer) 
Dummy 
Usize Retail unit size Numerical 
Sgrouping Size grouping of tenants (as defined in Table1) Categorical 
Scage Shopping centre age from the original opening date Numerical 
Lterm Retailer’s lease term (years) Numerical 
Noutlets Number of outlets retailer has in the 148 shopping centres Numerical 
Ngrouping Number of outlets grouping (as defined in Table2) Categorical 
SQRTSCsize Square root of GLA of the shopping centre Numerical 
LnSCunits Logarithm of total number of unit in the shopping centre Numerical 
SClevels The number of level in the shopping centre Numercial 
SClocation Location type of the shopping centre, 3(in Town), 2(out of town, 
district), 1(out of town, regional) 
Categorical 
SCenclose Enclosure type of the occupied shopping centre, 3(enclosed), 2(covered), 
1(open). 
Categorical 
SCcatchment The catchment area population defined by EGI’s Shopping Centre 
Research Database 
Numerical 
SQSCcatchm
ent 
Square of the catchment area population Numerical 
Footfalls The average weekly footfall of the shopping centre Numerical 
Parking Total parking spaces within the shopping centre Numerical 
 
The second stage uses one-way ANOVA to test differences in average rent per square 
foot among the different size and chain strength as defined in Table 1 and Table 2, in 
an attempt to clarify the rental distribution among different retail categories. In 
relation to the size groups we test the null hypothesis that 
ssssssH mmmmmm ===== 543210 : , where 51... ss mm  are the mean rent per square 
foot for group1 to 5 in table1, and sm  is the mean rent per square foot of all size 
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groups, i.e. the average rent per square foot for all tenant sizes. For chain strength, the 
null hypothesis is NNNNNH mmmmm ==== 32100 : , where 30 ... NN mm  are the mean 
rents per square foot for group 0 to 3 in Table 2, and Nm  is the mean rent per square 
foot of all groups.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The two-stage process gives encouraging results. In the regression models, the 
majority of variables are significant and corrected signed- including those that relate to 
inter-store externalities. The analysis of variance tests also identify significant 
relationships between rents and the retail characteristics that relate to shopping centre 
cross-benefits.  
 
Table4: the multi-regression results of Model 1 and Model 2 
Dependent variable LnY: Logarithm of adjusted rent per square foot 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeffi SE t-Stat Prob. Coeffi SE t-Stat Prob. 
 
Intercept 1.903 0.30 6.26 0.00 2.542 0.28 9.02 0.00 
RRRL 0.001 0.00 2.22 0.03 0.001 0.00 2.49 0.01 
STenant -0.171 0.05 -3.26 0.00 -0.105 0.05 -2.31 0.02 
SCage -0.015 0.00 -5.89 0.00 -0.013 0.00 -5.87 0.00 
Lterm 0.004 0.00 1.07 0.29 0.011 0.00 3.33 0.00 
Usize -0.001 0.00 -4.73 0.00     
Sgrouping     -0.477 0.02 -22.94 0.00 
Noutlets 0.005 0.00 7.16 0.00     
Ngrouping     0.152 0.02 7.26 0.00 
SQRTSCsize 0.001 0.00 2.35 0.02 0.001 0.00 2.72 0.01 
LNSCunits 0.188 0.07 2.61 0.01 0.128 0.07 1.93 0.05 
SCLevels -0.002 0.03 -0.07 0.95 0.011 0.03 0.43 0.67 
SCLocation 0.106 0.04 2.45 0.01 0.102 0.04 2.61 0.01 
SCenclose 0.044 0.04 1.06 0.29 0.062 0.04 1.62 0.11 
SCcatchment 0.000 0.00 -2.67 0.01 0.000 0.00 -1.94 0.05 
SQSCcatchment 0.000 0.00 2.13 0.03 0.000 0.00 1.78 0.08 
Footfalls 0.000 0.00 4.78 0.00 0.000 0.00 4.45 0.00 
Parking -0.000 0.00 -0.34 0.74 0.000 0.00 0.04 0.97 
R-squared 0.34 0.44 
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.44 
F-statistic  36.97 57.79 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Sample (adjusted): 1892,  
Included observations: 1108 
Excluded observations: 784 after adjusting endpoints 
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As discussed above, one of the major objectives in this research is to define “strong” 
tenants. According to the three hypotheses, those larger in size, stronger in chain 
numbers or defined as “top” retailers in different retail categories, should generate 
positive inter-store externalities. Therefore, these retailers should enjoy lower rent as 
“rent subsidies”. From the estimated results (Table 4), the results are consistent with 
the first and third hypotheses. But the second hypothesis, the number of outlets in 148 
shopping centres, the result is opposite to that as expected. We explore these factors in 
more depth before returning to the other variables. 
 
Unit Size 
 
The results from Model 1 and Model 2 show that both unit size and size grouping 
have a significant negatively relation with rent per square foot (at ?=  1%). This 
means, in effect, the larger the tenant, the lower the rent. In Model 2, the significance 
of the size grouping is even stronger than the numerical variable used in Model 1. 
 
Table5: The GLM5 Procedure  between rent/sq ft and size groups  
Dependent Variable: Y   Adjusted Rent(sq ft) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 4 465434 116359 44.33 <.0001 
Error 1816 4766241 2625   
Corrected Total 1820 5231679    
Class level information: Class variable “Sgroup”, Levels 5, Value 1,2,3,4,5 
 
Table6: Average rent/sq ft of different size group of tenants 
Sgrouping N 
Least square means 
(average adjusted 
rent/sq ft) 
1 Small Tenants under (under 1,500 sq ft) 819 66.51 
2 Small standard Tenants (1,500-4,000 sq ft) 711 41.67 
3 Large Standard tenants (4,000-10,000 sq ft) 216 28.30 
4 Major space users (10,000-30,000sq ft) 61 15.99 
5 Anchor tenants (over 30,000sq ft) 14 11.47 
Ys (All tenant size groups) 1821 50.16 
NOTE: Number of observations    1924 
Due to missing values, only 1821 observations can be used in this analysis. 
 
The next step in testing unit size is to know more detail about the distribution of rent 
per square foot among different size groups. The result from one-way ANOVA (Table 
5) shows that the null hypotheses, i.e. all means per square foot in each group are 
equal has been strongly rejected (P (F=0)<1%). 
 
                                                 
5 General Linear Model (GLM) 
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Table6 shows the distribution of average rent per square foot among the different size 
groups and gives us detailed information on rent subsidies and premiums. The 
average rent per square foot for all size groups is about ?50.16. This average rent, 
surprisingly, falls between group1 (small tenants) and 2 (small standard tenants). This 
implies that typical group5 (anchor tenant), group4 (MSUs), group3 (large standard 
tenants), and many tenants in group4 (small standard tenants) can enjoy relatively 
lower rents. Most of the responsibility for the burdens of rent premiums falls on small 
tenants and some small standard tenants. 
 
This does not mean that the lower mean rent for all size groups above small tenants is 
only because they are inter-store externalities generators. Other possible reasons 
include the diminishing marginal utility in space usage such that the marginal price of 
extra space has to be lower and cost savings for landlords through scale economies in 
letting to larger tenants. Despite the lower rent/sq ft for larger tenants, their overall 
total rent for the shopping centre is higher. Compared to small tenants, their operating 
cost in relation to rent may not be as high. Moreover, larger space users usually can 
reduce the overall vacancy rate and provide a more stable income stream. Therefore, 
the landlord may be willing to provide some allowance in the form of lower rent for 
larger tenants. 
 
Number of outlets 
 
The second variable linked to positive inter-store externalities is strength of chain 
stores. From previous research (Benjamin, et al. 1990; West 1992), strong chain stores 
should provide a relatively more stable income stream and market popularity. 
Therefore, we might predict that the stronger the chain store, the lower the rent other 
things equal. However, Table 4 shows that both in Model 1 and Model 2, prior 
expectations are not met. Both the numerical and categorical variables based on 
number of outlets firmly  suggest that the stronger the chain store, the higher the rent 
(both significant at a =1%). 
 
Testing the distribution of rent using one-way ANOVA (Table7) shows that null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at 1% or 5% confidence level; therefore, the average 
rents among these 4 groups may be equal. Independent tenants even pay a relatively 
lower average rent per square foot (£44.26) than the other three groups (Table 8). 
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The regression result is the opposite of our original hypothesis and the result of 
Benjamin, et al. (1990), though is consistent with the result provided by Tay, et al6. 
(1999). However, we wish to add some other rationale for the result obtained here that 
differs from the reasons provided by Tay, et al. (1999). The first reason is that after 
examination of the membership of the strong chain group, we found out that many 
strong chains are relatively small tenants, in terms of space use. They, therefore, have 
to pay a higher rent for their occupation. The second plausible reason is that some of 
the stronger chains are in relatively “weak” retail categories. This means they are 
either impulsive goods retailers or in a retail category, such as cards, gifts and gadgets 
or ladies’ accessories, which are relatively more dependent on other retailers’ positive 
inter-store externalities for turnover. The higher the rent may, thus, capture this effect. 
 
Top retailers 
 
Although the number of outlets, as a proxy for the strength of chain stores, does not 
confirm our second hypothesis, we still believe that size should not be the sole index 
for “strong” tenants. Therefore a third variable for testing the relationship between 
rent and strength of tenant is derived from published data in Freeman’s Guide 2002 
that provides the top rankings in each retail/commercial service category. The “top” 
retailers are defined by Freeman’s in terms of their number of branches, turnover, or 
number of outlets all over the UK.  
                                                 
6 Their reasons for arguing that the stronger the chain stores, the higher the rents are a) lower 
probability of default implies higher willingness to pay and b) chain stores have a greater demand for 
prime space. 
Table 8: Average Rent/sq ft of Chain Store Grouping of Tenants 
Ngrouping N Least square means 
(Adjusted rent/sq ft) 
0 Independent (1 outlet) 394 44.26 
1 Weak Chain (2-10 outlets) 441 52.08 
2 Medium Chain (10-50 outlets) 573 50.54 
3 Strong Chain (Over 50 outlets in 148SCs) 382 53.85 
Yc (Y Mean) 1790 50.24 
NOTE: Number of observations 1924 
Due to missing values, only 1790 observations can be used in this analysis. 
Table7: The GLM Procedure  Between Rent/sq ft And Number of Outlets Groups 
Dependent Variable: Y   Adjusted Rent(sq ft) 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 3 20602 6867 2.37 0.0690 
Error 1786 5179186 2900   
Corrected 
Total 
1789 5199788    
Class level information: Class variable “Ngrouping”, level 4, value 0,1,2,3 
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The result from Table 4 gives us a significant (a <5%) negative relation between rent 
per square foot and the strong tenant (STenant) variable. This shows that top retailers 
do enjoy a lower rent than other non-top tenants. In Model 1 STenant is significant at 
the a = 0.01 level and beyond; in Model 2 the significance of the t-statistic is slightly 
lower, (p=0.0212). 
 
Once again, we examined the detailed distribution of average rent per square foot of 
the top retailers among various retail and service categories. In Table 9, the average 
rent per square foot for all categories is £50.07, and this average rent/sq ft for all the 
non-top tenants is £50.86. Most of the top retailers/service providers in their 
categories (all those from label 1 to 22) actually pay a relatively lower rent. However, 
there are some tenants (from label 23 to 29) who seem to pay a relatively higher rent 
no matter whether they are “top” retailers or not. Examining the detail of these latter 
retailers, we can see that they are either occupy the prime space (on the highest pitch 
of pedestrian flow) or/and have high rental payment capacity (like jewellers and 
mobile phone retailers). Some generally require the best/longest storefront position. 
Although one can argue that the sample size of each retail categories are not equally 
sampled, this still can give us some clue that to be a “strong” tenant and to enjoy a 
lower rent, a retailer may need to be both highly ranked within their retail category 
and, at the same time, be in a retail category that does not need a special location, 
placement or other costly physical/operational needs.  
 
Table 9: Average Rent(sq ft) Among Top Tenants of Different Retail Categories
Label Categories 
LSMEANS                      
(adjusted rent 
sq ft) N 
1 Top 5 Night Club 9.42 1 
2 Top 10 Supermarket 14.02 1 
3 Top 10 Furniture and Carpet 14.17 4 
4 Top 10 Department store 14.44 19 
5 Top 10 Homeware (Variety store, Catalogue store) 15.22 29 
6 Top 5 Pub 18.06 2 
7 Top 5 Car, Cycling accessories 18.69 2 
8 Top 10 Estate Agencies 27.14 2 
9 Top 10 Restaurants and Fast food 28.82 16 
10 Top 5 Music, video, computer game 29.39 14 
11 Top 10 Shoe 31.47 10 
12 Top 10 DIY, Builders 32.52 1 
13 Top 5 Hairdressers 33.46 6 
14  Other High Fashion Trade Names 34.33 9 
15 Top 5 Toy and Game 37.76 19 
16 Top 20 Fashion Trading 39.08 78 
17 Top 5 Childrenswear 41.38 9 
18 Top 5 Opticians 44.02 27 
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19 Top 10 Books, cards and stationery 44.79 55 
20 Top 5 Sports and Specialty clothing 45.08 40 
21 Top 5 Boots, Perfume and beauty 45.97 32 
22 Top 5 Dry cleaner, shoe repair 48.37 6 
0  Other non top retailers 50.86 1144 
23 Top 5 Photographic  55.21 9 
24 Top 10 Electrical retailers 55.95 24 
25 Top 10 Special Food 56.27 50 
26 Top 5 Fashion Accessories 58.85 14 
27 Top 10 Travel agent 60.91 24 
28 Top 10 Mobile Phone Retailers 65.17 103 
29 Top 5 Jewellers 72.30 80 
     
Y  Average of all tenants(Adjusted rent/sq ft) 50.07 1830 
 
Other Factors Influencing Rents 
 
Our analysis of inter-store impacts on rental levels has been set within a wider context 
of urban and regional influences and determinants of retail rents. The results obtained 
are broadly consistent with prior theory and with the influences identified in previous 
research (see, for example, Benjamin, et al. 1990, 1992; Gatzlaff, et al.1994; Sirmans 
& Guidry, 1993; Tay, et al. 1999).  
 
Rental levels will depend on the economic potential of the area in which the centre is 
located. From Table 4, we see that the regional retail rental level (which proxies both 
for regional income and for competitive demand for retail space) is positively related 
to tenant rent (a< 0.05). Shopping centre footfall, as a local indicator of consumer 
demand, is also positively related to rent. It is harder to specify a simple relationship 
between catchement area and tenant rent. After examining various transformations, 
the best model suggests a non-linear relationship combining SCcatchment and 
SQSCcatchment . This would be consistent with a gravity model interaction effect 
with increasing returns linked to population potential and place in the local and 
regional retail hierarchy. We also found that, other things equal, tenant rents were at 
their highest in town centres, falling for centres located in districts and at their lowest 
out of town. Such an effect is often masked by size of centre and date of construction, 
but is consistent with a standard bid-rent model of land values. 
 
We also examined shopping centre characteristics and their contribution to rent. Age 
of centre is negatively related to rent – the older the centre, the lower the rent. This 
result is consistent with the US findings of Sirmans & Guidry (1993) and Gatzlaff, et 
al. (1994), although Tay, et al. do not find such a relationship in Hong Kong. We also 
examined date of refurbishment but found no link to rent.  
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Similarly, number of parking places, the number of floors (levels) and a categorical 
variable measuring whether or not the centre was enclosed could not be related to rent 
at the 5% or 10% level of significance. While some of these variables have proved to 
be significant in other studies, it may be that they are proxied elsewhere in our model. 
Lease length is not significant in Model 1 but is positively related to rent in Model 2 – 
a result similar to that found by Tay, et al. (1999) but opposite to the suggestion in 
Benjamin, et al. (1990). This might indicate that tenants are prepared to pay higher 
rents for longer leases (associated perhaps with security of tenure, amortization period 
for fit out). However, the issue of the optimal lease length is complex and more work 
is needed here. 
 
Finally, shopping centre characteristics related to variety, image and overall customer 
drawing power were examined. We examined the overall size of the centre, the 
number of units and the average unit size. Considering all these variables would lead 
to major collinearity problems. The models reported in Table 4 show shopping centre 
size (as a measure of overall drawing power) and total number of units (as an 
indicator of variety and choice). In Model 1, transformed versions of both are found to 
be significantly and positively related to tenant rent (a < 0.05 in both cases).   
 
IV Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to model the rents of tenants in UK regional 
shopping centres, drawing on an extensive database of tenant and shopping centre 
characteristics. The results are highly encouraging. Factors influencing tenant rents 
include market potential factors derived from urban and regional economic theory and 
shopping centre characteristics identified in prior retail research. However, the model 
also includes variables that proxy for the interaction between tenants and the impact 
of positive in-centre externalities. We find that store size is significantly and 
negatively related to tenant rent extending prior work on anchor store effects. In 
addition to anchor stores, other larger tenants, perhaps as a result of the positive 
effects generated by their presence, pay relatively lower rents while smaller stores, 
benefiting from the generation of demand, pay relatively higher rents. Similarly, we 
find that brand leader tenants pay lower rents than othe r tenants within individual 
retail categories. However, our initial measure of chain strength does not seem to be 
strongly related to rental levels.  
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These results suggest that a full understanding of in-centre externalities and the way 
that the contribution of generators of positive benefits is “rewarded” by a lower rent in 
a form of Pigouvian subsidy is important in modelling shopping centre rents. There 
are many avenues for developing this work. They might include closer examination of 
chain strength in the rent setting process; incorporation of measures of tenant variety 
and tenant quality in the models, perhaps using some diversity or concentration index 
like a Herfindahl index; and further exploration of tenant mix issues using 
multivariate procedures. It would also be interesting – if difficult – to consider 
negative externalities as a contributor to rent. However, it is likely that many of these 
are controlled through “regulatory” means by exclusion of non-conforming uses by 
landlords or through terms in lease contracts. Nonetheless, we believe that the current 
paper makes a contribution to the retail literature both in confirming the significance 
of accepted rental drivers and in emphasising that contribution to agglomeration 
economies and positive externalities leads to lower unit rents for certain types of 
tenants: those occupying more space and those who are brand leaders within their 
retail category. 
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